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Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
Scope
This memo presents the international standards for forensic digital evidence, the standard
of collection and handling of such evidence and how such evidence has been used in
international tribunals and the United States courts. * There are a variety of factors and
issues that need to be addressed when digital evidence is used in trials. The main factors
of digital evidence that need to be evaluated are 1) authentication; 2) hearsay; 3)
provenance (chain of custody); and 4) preservation of evidence. Depending on the type of
evidence (such as computers, cell phones, emails, social media accounts etc.) the
techniques used to process the evidence varies in order to preserve the factors mentioned
above.

Summary of Conclusions
Authentication
When considering cases that deal with digital evidence, the international criminal courts
seem to prefer testimony of an expert to verify the authenticity of digital evidence.

What, if any, are the internationally recognized or basic forensic standards for
investigations involving digital media or evidence, whether it involves the contents
of a computer, mobile telephone, or any other such device? What are the standards
for the collection and handling of such evidence, as well as its maintenance prior to
collection, where applicable? What sanctions have been imposed by international
and domestic courts where there have been violations of applicable standards for
maintaining, collecting or handling such digital evidence? Does this result in the
exclusion of such evidence? Are there examples where the mishandling of such
evidence has resulted in inferences being drawn in favor of the opposing party?
Does the international case law have anything to say about calling individuals from
corporate information providers to testify to the authenticity of the digital evidence
provided by the corporation? If so, what sorts of individuals from a corporation are
called to provide authentication evidence?
*
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Furthermore, the courts add documentary evidence such as an audio recording or
transcripts to testimonies in order to aid authentication.

Hearsay
The ICC has not plainly dealt with hearsay in many cases but this is due to lack of a
formal rule. Nonetheless, the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC generally admit hearsay when
it is used to aid other more reliable evidence. In order for hearsay to be admitted
prosecutors have used live testimony from the people who were involved in handling the
digital evidence, where they showed a chain of custody and explained their methods of
handling the evidence. The ICC has admitted anonymous hearsay in the past so there
does not seem to be a bar on this type of evidence.

Provenance
According to case law it seems that the courts put the most weight on authorship. With
this in mind, there are many situations where authorship could be difficult to determine,
such as a non-governmental actor having an audio recording where the author may not be
locatable or identified. The evidence may be at risk of exclusion, if the identities of those
who possessed the evidence before it reached the investigators, are not properly verified.

Preservation
The international criminal courts have given insufficient guidance on what are the best
procedures to preserve digital evidence. Furthermore, it seems that the courts have not
taken any measures to ensure the digital evidence has been properly preserved before it
reaches the investigators. Investigators should be very careful when handling digital
evidence and should keep a log of their investigations to alleviate any evidence problems
in the future. The Principal investigation should not be performed on the original device,
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but rather on a copy of the device. Each part of the forensic analysis should be capable of
reproduction by other investigators.

Factual Background
Digital evidence requires special considerations and imposes specific challenges to the
International Criminal Court, Tribunals, as well as United States Courts. Digital evidence
is defined as information transmitted or stored in a digital format that a party to a case
may use at a proceeding.1 Digital evidence may come in a variety of forms such as
videos, audio recordings, email, web sites and photographs. Depending on the type,
digital evidence may be used to help prosecutors establish and potentially prove their
case. This type of evidence can be easily modified, may not provide complete
information and may be removed from the author, all of which can have an effect on the
admissibility of the evidence. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has been dealing
with issues of admissibility of digital evidence. A good amount of the cases depend on
digital evidence in order to secure their convictions. Examining international standards
for digital evidence forensics can help the STL establish guidelines and procedures to
help in future cases. Once these procedures are established and well known, the STL will
be able to process cases more efficiently and with more certainty. Generally, in order for
evidence to be admissible, the courts look at four factors: 1) authentication; 2) hearsay; 3)
provenance (chain of custody); and 4) preservation of evidence.

1

See Eoghan Casey, Digital Evidence and Computer Crime (3d ed. 2011).
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Legal Analysis
The international criminal courts incorporate both common law and civil law procedures.
In the civil law system all evidence is submitted and the judge later determines its
probative value, while the common law system has incorporated more prohibitions and
rules on excluding evidence that is unreliable or irrelevant.2 Rule 69(2) directs ICC
judges to determine the probative value and “appropriate weight” of admitted evidence at
the end of a case, when considering evidence as a whole.3 ICTY and ICTR have framed
away from the common law system when it comes to admissibility of evidence, because
they believed that the rules promulgated in common law were put there to limit evidence
to juries, and thus do not apply to the tribunals.4 In order to be admitted, evidence must
satisfy “minimum standards of relevance and reliability.”5 The ICC has created the “eCourt Protocol”, which gives the standards for digital evidence even before it is
submitted at the Confirmation Hearing.6 The purpose of the protocol is to “ensure

Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 ¶ 17 fn.28 (Nov. 19,
2010). Aida Ashouri, Caleb Bowers, Cherrie Warden, An overview of the Use of Digital
Evidence in International Criminal Courts, (2013), available at
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Scholarly_articles_Salzburg_2013.pdf.
(“Overview”).
2

3

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ¶ 17

Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Order on the Standards
Governing the Admission of Evidence, ¶ 14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 15, 2002).
4

5

Id. at ¶13. Derived from Overview

Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision
Amending the e-Court Protocol, 4 (Apr. 28, 2011). Derived from Overview
6
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authenticity, accuracy, confidentiality and preservation of the record of proceedings.”7
There are various things that need to be done in order to meet the requirements of the
Protocol.8 The Protocol helps in uniformity of court documents, but getting the evidence
admitted to the court is only one hurdle to overcome. The next hurdle that needs to be
overcome is the probative issue of digital evidence, which is present in every court, and
discussed below.

A. Evidentiary Considerations
i. Authentication
Authentication shows that the admitted evidence has not been manipulated or
tampered with. Cases suggest that international criminal courts establish authenticity,
regardless of the type of indicators used, in two distinct ways. The prosecution either uses
the digital evidence to establish the authenticity of the indicator or the prosecution uses
an indicator to establish the authenticity of digital evidence. For instance, a prosecutor
can use a transcript (indicator) to prove the authenticity of a video (digital evidence).9 On

International Criminal Court e-Court Protocol at ¶ 1, ICC-01/04-01/10-87-Anx 3003-2011, available at http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1049623.pdf
7

International Criminal Court e-Court Protocol, ICC-01/04-01/10-87-Anx 30-032011, available at http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1049623.pdf. The Protocol
does not offer an exhaustive list but it does help identify potential issues with the
evidence being considered.
8

See Prosecutor v. Karemera, et al. Case No. IT-98-44-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 169-173, 205
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Feb. 2, 2012)(transcript of radio broadcast
authenticated the date of the video of rally and corroborated evidence that the
accused was present at the time); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. IT-98-41-T, Trial
Judgment and Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 2029-2031, 460 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Dec. 8, 2008; Dec. 14, 2011)(transcript authenticated the video footage, which was
corroborating evidence, that the accused was acting as Minister of Defense and
exercised control over the army). Derived from Overview
9

9

the other hand, the prosecution can use a photograph (digital evidence) to prove the
authenticity of a testimony (indicator).10 Nonetheless, courts appear to favor
authentication of digital evidence through external indicators, such as a testimony or
transcript.11 Thus, in order to prove authenticity, it is critical to corroborate the digital
evidence.
ii. Hearsay
Hearsay is evidence of facts outside the direct knowledge of the testifying
witness.12 The probative value of digital evidence hearsay can be enhanced with
corroborating evidence, such as explanations of the procedures by which the digital
evidence was obtained, live testimony, and including testimony of those involved in
obtaining it.13 Showing a chain of custody in the presentation of the digital evidence
reinforces the reliability of the evidence.14 Furthermore, the weight of the evidence can
be increased when it is corroborated it with evidence of higher probative value.15 It has
not been established whether hearsay evidence can ever be admitted on its own. Digital
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, et al., Case No. ICTR 98-42AR73.2, Decision on
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko’s Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 7 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 2004)(photographs were used to authenticate the witness’
testimony, but ultimately deemed inadmissible because of inconsistencies between
the testimony and indictment timeline). Derived from Overview
10

11

Id. Derived from Overview

Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 21 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005). Derived from Overview
12

Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2, Trial Judgment, ¶ 64 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2012). Derived from Overview
13

14

Id. at ¶ 64, fn.165. Derived from Overview

15

Id. at ¶ 65. Derived from Overview
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documents or communications of deceased people could be a situation where the court
would have to make this decision. Additionally, there is the issue of knowing when
expert testimony and chain of custody are sufficient to make the digital hearsay evidence
reliable.
iii. Provenance (Chain of Custody)
Provenance, is defined as “[t]he movement and location of real evidence, and the
history of those persons who had it in their custody, from the time it is obtained to the
time it is presented in court.”16 During the admissibility stage within the international
courts, the bar for admission is usually low and there is no specific amount of author
testimony required.17 When it comes to the question of weather it is necessary for the
author to testify to establish the chain of custody, the ad hoc tribunals have taken
different approaches in their answers. Some international courts have even refused to
admit corroborating witness testimony without having the testimony of the author, while
other international courts have not automatically denied the evidence when author
testimony was not available.18 Nonetheless, international courts prefer that the

16

Black’s Law Dictionary 260 (9th ed. 2009).

Blagojevic and Jokic, ICTY, Judgement, ¶ 30, n.72 (Jan. 17, 2005) (Handwritten
notebooks of radio intercept recordings were accepted without complete audiotape
recordings when the notebooks were accompanied by testimony of intercept
operators. This was despite Defense objections to lack of operator training
unreliable transcriptions, substandard equipment, and the Prosecution’s failure to
admit original recordings.); Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T,
Decision on the Admission Into Evidence of Intercept-Related Materials, ¶ 2 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 18, 2003) (procedures were described by
sufficient similarity and the operators “took their task seriously”). Derived from
Overview
17

Brdanin and Talic, ICTY, Order on the Standards Governing the Admission of
Evidence, ¶ 20 (Feb. 15, 2002). But see Prosecutor v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-3118
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prosecution offer some sort of live testimony, ideally the author’s, before they admit or
give weight to the digital evidence.
The cases imply that the most evidentiary weight is given to provenance when if
is accompanied by live witness testimony. The testimony of the author is a key factor. It
seems that when author testimony is not available or inaccurate, then other testimony can
give weight to the evidence. The other testimony can include corroboration of one or
multiple witnesses, or it can include testimony of investigators and other parties to the
suit.19 Generally, the cases show that authorship is the main consideration, when the
international courts try to establish the weight of evidence based on chain of custody.
vi. Preservation
There is a lack of strict preservation standards in the ad hoc tribunals.20 ICTY could take
into account other factors to find reliability and authenticity, therefore accuracy and

T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 841 (July 14, 2009); Renzaho, ICTR, Decision on
Exclusion of Testimony and Admission of Exhibit, ¶¶ 1-2 (Mar. 20, 2007). Derived
from Overview
See Tolimir, ICTY, Judgement, ¶¶ 64-70 (Dec. 12, 2012); Prosecutor v. Brdanin,
Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶ 34, n.38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004). But see Renzaho, ICTR, Decision on Exclusion of
Testimony and Admission of Exhibit, ¶¶ 1-2 (Mar. 20, 2007). Derived from
Overview
19

Prosecutor v. Popovic, et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Decision on Admissibility of
Intercepted Communications, ¶ 39 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec.
7, 2007). Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgement Volume I, ¶¶
72-75 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010). Prosecutor v.
Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 69-70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2012). Prosecutor v. Popovic, et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T,
Decision on Admissibility of Intercepted Communications, ¶ 39 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2007). Derived from Overview
20
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completeness of preservation was not a prerequisite to admission,21 Additionally, digital
evidence that had inaccuracies due to not being in its original form was allowed in the
ICTY.22 However, the ICC is developing ways on standardizing the preservation of
digital evidence, such as implementing the e-Court Protocol.23 The Protocol creates
consistency, but also creates problems due to degradation of data quality, and the
Protocol can require a lengthy process of compiling metadata on individual pieces of
evidence.24 Additionally, there is a limitation to these methods. Investigators do not have
access to digital evidence before it is in their custody. Therefore, the protocol may
alleviate preservation problems once the evidence is in the hands of the investigators, but
it does not reduce the threat of tampering before that time.

Investigative Approach to Digital Evidence
The approach investigators take in collecting digital evidence can determine its
admissibility and probative value. The courts look at the prongs mentioned above and
therefore investigators must act in a way that will satisfy the requirements of the courts.
Popovic, et al., ICTY, Decision on Admissibility of Intercepted Communications, at
¶¶ 22, 52 (Dec. 7, 2007) (The court detailed that intercept operators followed
“general procedures” with “near uniformity” to record the conversations onto
audiotapes, eavesdrop on radio communications, and then transcribed the
conversations into handwritten notebooks. The notebooks were then typed onto
computers and sent to command.); Blagojevic and Jokic, ICTY, Judgement, n.72 (Jan.
17, 2005). Derived from Overview
21

See Popovic, et al., ICTY, Decision on Admissibility of Intercepted
Communications, ¶¶ 22, 52 (Dec. 7, 2007); Blagojevic and Jokic, ICTY, Judgement,
n.72 (Jan. 17, 2005). Derived from Overview
22

Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision
Amending the e-Court Protocol, 4 (Apr. 28, 2011). Derived from Overview
23

24

Id. Derived from Overview
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The following guidelines and protocols are collections from the Association of Chief
Police officers (“ACPO”)25 and U.S. Department of Justice26 because both sources are
heavily cited on topics of forensic digital evidence. Furthermore, the guidelines are
supplemented by other sources, which seem to specialize in each sector in which they are
mentioned. As new technologies emerge, the guidelines and procedures will have to be
updated. The following is not an exhaustive analysis but should provide a great amount
of insight to investigators on how to deal with digital forensic evidence.
Electronic evidence found in today’s world can be found in many different forms.
The investigators must first determine what type of electronic device they are dealing
with because potential evidence may differ according to the device.27 Furthermore, the
investigators should make sure that they have all the tools needed in order to evaluate the
evidence properly.28

NETWORKS
Networks in the home are usually based on Internet connections through modems and
wireless routers. The network in the corporate environment is more complex and

Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf.
25

U.S. Department of Justice, Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for
Law Enforcement, (2014), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199408.pdf.
26

U.S. Department of Justice, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First
Responders, (2001), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/187736.pdf 923 (provides a list of electronic devices and what potential evidence may be gained
from each type).
27

28

See Id. 23-24.
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therefore requires a different approach. Additionally, wireless networks are not controlled
like traditional networks and may be accessed by anyone who is in radio range. 29
Home Network
The investigator should identify and check the network devices to see how much network
or Internet activity is taking place.30 Photographing the network and devices connected to
the network would allow future reconstruction of the evidence. Once the investigators
know that no data will be lost, then they may isolate the network from the internet.31
Investigators should then trace each wire from the network device to determine to which
other devices it is connected.32 If the wires are concealed within walls, then the
investigator should consult the local IT administrator and make note of all connections.33
Each connection should be labeled so the scene could be reconstructed and it is highly
recommended to take pictures of the setup.34 Investigators should consider making a
connection to the access point/router in order to establish the external IP

Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 23.
29

Id. at 24 (Possibly use a network detector and also give consideration to mobile
internet devices such as 3G, GPRS or phones, which operate on a mobile phone
network).
30

Id. (“This is best done by identifying the connection to the telephone system or
wireless communications point and unplugging it from the telephone point. Keep
modems and routers running, as they may need to be interrogated to find out what
is connected to them. Owing to their nature, it is particularly difficult to ascertain
what is connected to a wireless network”).
31

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.
15

address.35 Once the investigator identifies that that the impact of removing devices is low,
they can isolate the computer from the network as well as remove the cables from the
networking devices.36
Corporate network
If a system administrator is not part of the investigation, then the investigator should seek
their assistance. It is likely that the most significant issue will be the inability to shut
down server(s) due to company operational constraints.37 “In such cases, it is common
practice that a network enabled ‘forensic software’ agent is installed, which will give the
ability to image data across the network ‘on-the-fly’, or to a network share or a locally
connected removable storage medium such as a USB hard drive.”38 Other devices may be
useful such as routers and firewalls because they can give insight into network
configuration through Access Control Lists (ACLs) or security rule sets.39 When the
devices are accessed, data may be added, which would usually violate principles of
forensics, but this may be alleviated if the logging mechanism is researched prior to the

Id. (“Most modern networks use Network Address Translation (NAT), which
means that they communicate with an internal IP address and never get assigned
and external IP one”).
35

Id. at 24-25. Also consider that mobile phones and PDAs might be connected to
devices via Bluetooth.
36

37

Id.

38

Id.

Id. (“This may be achieved by viewing the configuration screens as an
administrator of the device. This will require the user names and passwords
obtained at the time of seizure or from the suspect during interview”).
39
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investigation.40 For large company environments, the best approach is to get assistance
from the company’s administrators and support staff, as long as they are not suspects
themselves.41

COMPUTERS
Securing of evidence
It is recommended that the evidence be first secured according to known guidelines.42
The investigator should consider removing the device from any networks.43 The
investigators should seize and control the site where the electronic device is located.44
People should be removed from the scene and not be allowed to interact with the
devices.45 Photographs, videos, or sketches should be made of the scene that label all
cables, ports, and systems so it can be reconstructed on a later date.46 The investigators
should allow the printers to stop printing before they analyze them.47

40

Id. (When the investigators access the device, they leave a digital footprint).

41

Id.

U.S. Department of Justice, Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for
Law Enforcement, (2014), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199408.pdf
11 (Mentions that if no guidelines are available to the investigator, then useful
information can be found in Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First
Responders).
42

For a methodology on removing the computer from networks see supra
NETWORKS.
43

Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 31.
44

45

Id.

Id. (Sketches should be used as an alternative in photos and videos are not
possible).
46
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If the computer is switched off
Investigators should not under any circumstances turn on the computer.48 They should
make sure that the computer is off by moving the mouse and looking at the hard drive
and monitor activity lights because computers may be in sleep mode and look like they
are off.49 Investigators should be aware that some laptop computers turn on when the lid
is open, therefore, they should remove the battery from the laptop.50
If the computer is switched on
Investigators should Record what is on the screen by photographing it and by making a
written note of the content of the screen.51 Do not touch the keyboard or click the mouse.
If the screen is blank or a screen saver is present, the investigator should be asked to
decide if they wish to restore the screen. If so, a short movement of the mouse should
restore the screen or reveal that the screen saver is password protected. If the screen
restores, photograph or video the screen and note its content. If password protection is
shown, continue as below, without any further touching of the mouse. Record the time
and activity of the use of the mouse in these circumstances.52 If the system may contain
valuable evidence in its current state (for example, if it is currently displaying a relevant

47

Id.

48

Id. at 32.

49

Id.

50

Id. (Investigators should seize any power supplies for future use).

51

Id.

Id. (For games consoles, or tablet computers, the equivalent would be moving the
controller joystick or touching the touchscreen).
52

18

document or an instant message conversation), seizing officers should seek expert advice
from their local digital forensic unit as this may be lost if the power is lost.53 “Remove
the main power source battery from laptop computers.”54 However, prior to doing so,
consider if the machine is in standby mode. In such circumstances, battery removal could
result in avoidable data loss.55 “Unplug the power and other devices from sockets on the
computer itself (i.e. not the wall socket).”56 “When removing the power supply cable,
always remove the end connected to the computer, and not that attached to the socket.”57
“This will avoid any data being written to the hard drive if an uninterruptible power
supply is fitted.”58 “If the equipment was switched on, do not close down any programs
or shut down the computer, as this will cause changes to the stored data and may trigger
wiping software to run, if this is installed.”59 “Ensure that all items have signed and
completed exhibit labels attached to them.”60 “Failure to do so may create difficulties
with continuity and cause the equipment to be rejected by the digital forensic unit.”61

Id. (This is especially important if the suspect is a technically knowledgeable user
who may be using encryption, as there may be no way to retrieve evidence stored in
encrypted volumes once the power is lost).
53

54
55

Id.
Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.
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“Search the area for diaries, notebooks or pieces of paper with passwords on them, often
attached or close to the computer.”62 “Ask the user about the setup of the system,
including any passwords, if circumstances dictate.”63 “If these are given, record them
accurately.”64 “Allow the equipment to cool down before removal.”65 “Track any cables
that can be seen as they made lead you to other devices in other rooms.”66
Packaging, Transporting, and Storing of Evidence
Actions taken should not alter the evidence. An investigator should ensure that all
collected electronic evidence is properly labeled, documented, and inventoried before
packaging.67 All digital devices should be isolated from magnetic fields and should be
places into anti-static bags.68 “Avoid bending, folding, or scratching computer media
such as diskettes, CD–ROMs, and tapes.”69 “Ensure that all containers, which are used to

62

Id.

63

Id.
Id.

64
65

Id.

66

Id.

U.S. Department of Justice, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First
Responders, (2001), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/187736.pdf
35.
67

Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 33.
68

U.S. Department of Justice, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First
Responders, (2001), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/187736.pdf
35.
69

20

hold evidence, are properly labeled.”70 If multiple computer systems are collected, then
label each system so that it can be reassembled in the future.71 If the evidence is being
transported in a car, then it should be positioned upright to minimize shocks and should
be placed away from magnetic fields such as loudspeakers, heated seats & windows and
police radios.72 Investigators should avoid keeping electronic evidence in their cars for
longer periods of time because changes in the temperature and humidity can damage
devices. Investigators should maintain a detailed chain of custody log for all transported
equipment.73 The evidence should be stored in a location that has a controlled
temperature and humidity.74 Dust and other particles may be hazardous to the equipment,
and therefore should be a consideration for storage.75 Some devices have internal
batteries that control functions related to evidence, which is why the custodian of the
evidence should be informed of their existence so they may attend to the devices
accordingly.76

70

Id.

71

Id.

Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 33.
72

U.S. Department of Justice, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First
Responders, (2001), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/187736.pdf
36.
73

Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 33.
74

75

Id.

76

Id.
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Acquiring the evidence
The investigators should first document hardware and software configuration of the
examiner’s system.77 They should verify operation of the examiner’s computer system to
include hardware and software.78 “Disassemble the case of the computer to be examined
to permit physical access to the storage devices.”79 “Identify storage devices that need to
be acquired.”80 “These devices can be internal, external, or both.”81 “Document internal
storage devices and hardware configuration.”82 Disconnect storage devices to prevent the
damage, destruction, or alteration of data.83 “Retrieve configuration information from the
suspect’s system through controlled boots.”84 “Power the system down.”85 “Whenever

U.S. Department of Justice, Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for
Law Enforcement, (2014), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199408.pdf 11.
77

78

Id.

Id. (“Take care to ensure equipment is protected from static electricity and
magnetic fields”).
79

80

Id.

81

Id.

Id. (“Drive condition (e.g., make, model, geometry, size, jumper settings, location,
drive interface). Internal components (e.g., sound card; video card; network card,
including media access control (MAC) address; personal computer memory card
international association (PCMCIA) cards”).
82

Id. (by using the power connector or data cable from the back of the drive or from
the motherboard).
83

Id. at 12. (“Perform a controlled boot to capture CMOS/BIOS information and test
functionality -> Boot sequence (this may mean changing the BIOS to ensure the
system boots from the floppy or CD-ROM drive), time and date, power on
passwords”.
84
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possible, remove the subject storage device and perform the acquisition using the
examiner’s system.”86 Exceptional circumstances may result in a decision not to remove
the storage devices from the subject system.87 “When using the subject computer to
acquire digital evidence, reattach the subject storage device and attach the examiner’s
evidence storage device (e.g., hard drive, tape drive, CD-RW, MO).”88 “Write protection
should be initiated, if available, to preserve and protect original evidence.”89

“Perform a second controlled boot to test the computer’s functionality and the
forensic boot disk -> Ensure the power and data cables are properly connected to
the floppy or CDROM drive, and ensure the power and data cables to the storage
devices are still disconnected. Place the forensic boot disk into the floppy or CDROM drive. Boot the computer and ensure the computer will boot from the forensic
boot disk”.
“Reconnect the storage devices and perform a third controlled boot to capture the
drive configuration information from the CMOS/BIOS -> Ensure there is a forensic
boot disk in the floppy or CD-ROM drive to prevent the computer from accidentally
booting from the storage devices. Drive configuration information includes logical
block addressing (LBA); large disk; cylinders, heads, and sectors (CHS); or autodetect”).
85

Id.

Id. (“When attaching the subject device to the examiner’s system, configure the
storage device so that it will be recognized”).
86

Id. at 12-13. (Those include: RAID (redundant array of inexpensive disks) Removing the disks and acquiring them individually may not yield usable results;
Laptop systems - The system drive may be difficult to access or may be unusable
when detached from the original system; Equipment availability - The examiner
does not have access to necessary equipment; Network storage - It may be
necessary to use the network equipment to acquire the data).
87

Id. (“Ensure that the examiner’s storage device is forensically clean when
acquiring the evidence”).
88

89

See Id. for methods.
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Examining the evidence
The examination should be conducted on evidence that has been acquired by using
accepted forensic procedures. “Whenever possible, the forensic examination should not
be performed on the original device.”90
Preparation
“Prepare working directory/directories on separate media to which evidentiary files and
data can be recovered and/or extracted.”91
Extraction
Physical Extraction
“During this stage the extraction of the data from the drive occurs at the physical level
regardless of file systems present on the drive.”92 “This may include the following
methods: keyword searching, file carving, extraction of the partition table and unused
space on the physical drive.”93
Logical Extraction
In this stage the extraction of the data from the drive is based on the file system(s) present
on the drive and may include data from such areas as active files, deleted files, file slack,
and unallocated file space.94

90

Id. at 15.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id. For an explanation of the methods and their uses see Id. at 15-16.

94

See Id. at 16 for steps that may be included in the process.

24

Analysis of Extracted Data
Analysis is the process of interpreting the extracted data to determine their significance to
the case.95
Timeframe analysis
This can be useful in determining when events occurred on a computer system, which can
be used as a part of associating usage of the computer to an individual(s) at the time the
events occurred.96
Data hiding analysis
Due to the fact that data can be concealed on a computer system, Data hiding analysis can
be useful in detecting and recovering such data and may indicate knowledge, ownership,
or intent.97
Application and file analysis
“Many identified files and programs may contain information relevant to the
investigation and provide insight into the capability of the system and the knowledge of
the user.”98 Results of this analysis may indicate extra steps that need to be taken in the
extraction and analysis processes.99

95

Id.

96

Id. For the two methods used in this analysis see Id. at 16-17.

97

Id. at 17. See also Id. for methods that can be used.

98

Id.

99

Id. See also Id. for examples.
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Ownership and possession
In some cases the it may be necessary to determine the individual who created, modified
or accessed a file because ownership can be linked to knowledge of the digital
evidence.100
When each of these analyses is considered individually, they may not be sufficient to
draw a conclusion, but combining them and looking at them as a whole, may provide a
more complete picture.101

MOBILE DEVICES
Mobile phone capabilities range from simple telephone communication to those of a
personal computer.102
Tools
Investigators should use special forensic tools when accessing mobile devices. The tools
are broken down in a classification system to 5 categories. Those categories are: Manual
extraction, Logical extraction, Hex dumping/JTAG, Chip-off and Micro Read.103 Certain
tools are used in different parts of the investigation.104 Universal Integrated Circuit Card
tools use different data and therefore can provide additional information to the

100

Id. at 18.

101

Id.

For a detailed list of parts, capabilities, and their functions see Rick Ayers, Sam
Brothers, Wayne Jansen, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guidelines
on Mobile Device Forensics, (2014), available at
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-101r1.pdf 3-14.
102

103

See Id. at 17-20 for an explanation and use of each tool.

See Id. at 20-23 (providing tables, which show what tools are available and where
they are used).
104
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investigators.105 As mobile forensics tools have evolved, they have begun to provide
automated functions allowing examiners to bypass many security mechanisms as a part of
their products.106 For instance, some software-based tools provide an automated function
to recover passwords from locked mobile devices.107 Purely hardware methods are
usually inadequate but combining some hardware methods with software methods may
yield very effective results.108 Certain instigative methods can serve the same functions as
using forensic tools and those include: asking the owner, reviewing the seized material
and asking the service provider.109
Securing of Evidence
Securing mobile phones is in some aspects similar to computers but differs in others.110 It
is crucial to follow established procedures and traditional forensic techniques, such as
fingerprints or DNA evidence, may be used to establish a link between the mobile device
and its owner or user.111 Investigators should look for other electronic devices

See Id. at 23-24 (gives the types of data gathered and what can be revealed using
that data).
105

106

Id. at 24.

107

Id.

108

See Id. (gives multiple examples of this technique)

109

For an explanation of the methods see Id. at 24-25.

A simplified method can be found at Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO
Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence, (March 2012), available at
http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 32-33.
110

Rick Ayers, Sam Brothers, Wayne Jansen, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics, (2014), available at
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-101r1.pdf 27.
111

27

surrounding the mobile device because the surrounding devices might prove to be more
valuable than the mobile device itself.112 Mobile devices that may look broken should be
collected, because it may still be possible to extract data from the device.113 Photographs
of the scene and a record of all visible data should be created.114 Mobile devices should
be isolated from all networks because incoming signals may alter the evidence.115 The
investigator should determine if the mobile device should be shut down or kept on.116
Investigators should always record the date and time shown on the handset, if it is turned
on, and compare them with a reference clock, noting any inconsistencies.117 Furthermore,
investigators should be aware that security mechanisms, key remapping and malicious

Id. (“Personal computers may be particularly useful in later accessing a locked
mobile device, if the personal computer has established a trusted relationship with
it. For example, Apple incorporates a pairing process whereby an existing pairing
record file can be used by some tools [Zdz12] to access the mobile device while it is
still locked.”).
112

113

Id. at 28 (explains how to handle seemingly broken devices).

114

More details on documenting the scene can be found at Id.

Id. at 29 (explaining the various networks that can effect a mobile device as well
as providing methods on how to isolate the device from various networks). See also
Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 33 (it is
possible to wipe clean devices remotely).
115

Rick Ayers, Sam Brothers, Wayne Jansen, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics, (2014), available at
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-101r1.pdf 2930 (explaining the benefits and drawbacks of each choice).
116

117

Id. at 30.
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programs might be present on mobile devices.118 Devices may be put into radio isolating
containers to prevent network access.119 There are various network isolation techniques
that investigators can use and some examples are: cellular network isolation card (CNIC),
shielded containers, shielded work areas, disabling network service, and
jamming/spoofing devices.120 Once the mobile device has been seized, the investigator
should seal and label the device according to department guidelines.121 Due to the volatile
nature of mobile devices and battery life, the device should be immediately sent to the
laboratory.122 Storage facilities should have a electronically safe environment and be in a
secured area with controlled access. 123 Alternatively, an investigator may engage in onsite triage processing.124
Acquiring the Evidence
First the investigator must identify the device. Means of identification may include any of
the following: device characteristics, device interface, device label, carrier identification

118

Id. at 30-31 (lists examples of modifications to consider).

Id. at 31 (cautioning that not all containers are effective and that the
investigators should test the containers before using them at a scene).
119

120

See Id at 31-33 (provides more details about each technique).

121

Id. at 33.

122

Id.

123

Id.

Triaging involves performing a data extraction (i.e., Manual or Logical) on-scene
followed immediately by a preliminary analysis of the data extracted. See Id. at 3334 for information on how this procedure can be done.
124

29

and reverse lookup.125 Once the investigator has properly identified the device, then the
investigator must consider which tools to use in order to acquire the evidence.126 The
investigator should acquire all data that is on the mobile device memory.127 Special
considerations need to be given to GSM, iOS, Android, and Universal integrated circuit
card devices.128 Investigators should also consider tangential equipment, which includes
devices that contain memory and are associated with a mobile device.129 The three main
categories are memory cards, host computers to which a mobile device has synchronized
its contents and cloud-based storage.130
Analyzing the Evidence
Once a copy of the acquisition results are available, the next steps involve
searching the data, identifying evidence, creating bookmarks, and developing the
contents of a final report.131 The initial analysis techniques used should be the same as
for computer evidence.132 Additionally, investigators should analyze call and subscriber

125

For more information on each one of the means see Id. at 37-39.

126

See Id. 39-40 for considerations on which tools to use.

127

For an explanation on the procedures see Id. at 40-42.

128

See. Id. at 42-45 (explaining all of the considerations and how to deal with them).

129

Id. at 45.

See Id. at 45-47 (providing detailed information on each category and its uses in
an investigation).
130

131

Id. at 50.

132

See supra Computer Analysis.

30

records. Service providers maintain records of their clients for billing purposes.133 This
record may be useful in an investigation because it aids the investigators with more
potential evidence that could be combined with already existing evidence. The retention
period for service providers varies and therefore investigators should act immediately.134
Cell site analysis is an additional technique that investigators can use when
analyzing mobile devices.135 Today, traditional defendant location evidence may be
supplemented with historical cell site analysis (CSA) evidence in cases where one or
more cellular phones can be connected to defendants, accomplices, coconspirators,
victims, or witnesses at times and places relevant to the charged offenses.136 CSA
evidence is considered historical because the records used in the analysis are historical
records of completed cell phone calls and transmitted text messages.137 Historical CSA
evidence involves using historical call detail records (CDRs) to identify the pattern of
movements and location over time of relevant cell phones 1) within mapped radio
frequency (RF) areas, 2) relative to geographically-fixed cell towers, and 3) at fixed
Rick Ayers, Sam Brothers, Wayne Jansen, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics, (2014), available at
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-101r1.pdf 52.
133

134

Id. (retention also varies on the type of record).

Peter Sommer, Information Assurance Advisory Council, Digital Evidence, digital
Investigations and E-Disclosure: A Guide to Forensic Readiness for Organizations,
Security Advisors and Lawyers, (2012), available at
https://cryptome.org/2014/03/digital-investigations.pdf 61.
135

United States Department of Justice Executive Office for United States Attorneys,
Obtaining and Admitting Electronic Evidence, (2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/11/30/usab5906.pd
f 16.
136

137

Id.
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points in time.138 Narrowing the geographic location of cell phones to unique cell tower
sectors at specific times, is helpful in establishing the proximity of identified cell phones
relative to crime scenes, and other relevant locations, along with movement patterns of
the cell phones.139 Historical CSA evidence also can be used to corroborate the testimony
of a bystander witness, accomplice getaway driver, or victim.140 The nature and accuracy
of historical CSA usually only allows defendants to question the identity of the person
who was next to the phone.141 CSA is a science that employs a special type of technology
and is implemented through specific network architecture.142 Planning in advance is
required to use historical cell site analysis evidence in a criminal trial.143 Records
required for historical cell site analysis include call detail records, cell tower data and cell
tower maps.144 Historical cell site analysis evidence can be presented through a witness
who is qualified “as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” if
the witness’ testimony will be offered in the form of an opinion or otherwise and such
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data and is the product of reliable principles and
methods that the witness has reliably applied to the facts of the case.145 Additionally, non-

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 16-17.

142

For a detailed explanation see Id. at 17-22.

143

Id. at 23.

144

Id. at 23-24 (gives descriptions and approaches to the records).

145

Id. at 24 (citing to Fed. R. Evid. 702).
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expert summary testimony involving historical cell site analysis may be offered where
such testimony is limited to presentation of summary maps, charts, or other
demonstrative summary exhibits based on evidence admitted at trial without offering any
expert opinions.146 Experts include FBI’s Cellular Analysis Survey Team (CAST),
specially-trained law enforcement and cell provider employee experts.147 Expert
testimony may not be possible because of various factors but, an argument can be made
that summary testimony limited to charts or maps based on evidence admitted during trial
should be admissible through non-expert testimony.148 For example United States v.
Sanchez call detail records were provided by a private contractor and not the cell
providers record custodian, nonetheless, the records were allowed into evidence.149
Prosecutors should consider restricting testimony by a non-expert summary witness to
mapped crime scenes and cell tower locations, along with corresponding call detail
record information admitted into evidence such as dates, times, connecting telephone
numbers, and incoming/outgoing communications.150 Any additional testimony detailing
others aspects, arguably may require that the witness be an expert.151 Evidence from

146

Id.

147

See Id. 24-25 for more information on each group.

148

Id.

149

United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 929 (11th Cir. 2009).

United States Department of Justice Executive Office for United States Attorneys,
Obtaining and Admitting Electronic Evidence, (2011), acailable at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/11/30/usab5906.pd
f 25.
150

151

Id. at 25-26.
33

historical cell site analysis should include call detail records, cell tower location and
sector orientation, RF mapping and JDSU drive test. 152 It is unlikely that cell cite
location data will be released without law enforcement-sponsored warrant or Court Order
but an exemption exist for people who have consented to being tracked.153
Documenting and Reporting the Evidence
This section applies to all electronic evidence. Documenting is a highly important aspect
of the investigation and the investigators should accurately document their actions
throughout the whole investigations.154 Documenting should be done simultaneously with
investigating and should follow general guidelines.155 During an investigation,
information of evidentiary value might be found that is outside of the investigation’s
scope.156 Therefore, examiners should document those findings and bring them to the
attention of agents.157 The examiners report should follow departmental guidelines.158

152

For a detailed description of each see Id. at 26-29.

Peter Sommer, Information Assurance Advisory Council, Digital Evidence, digital
Investigations and E-Disclosure: A Guide to Forensic Readiness for Organizations,
Security Advisors and Lawyers, (2012), available at
https://cryptome.org/2014/03/digital-investigations.pdf 62. (explains ways people
can consent to being tracked such as Google maps or other means that will show a
person where they are currently located).
153

U.S. Department of Justice, Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence: A Guide for
Law Enforcement, (2014), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199408.pdf 19.
154

155

For a list of general guidelines see Id.

156

Id. at 20.

157

Id.

158

For a list of things to be included in a report see Id. at 20.
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The report should consist of a summary of findings, details of findings, supporting
materials and glossary.159

WEBSITES
The most convenient way for investigators to obtain website information is to make a
copy of the page.160 It is essential that an audit trail of all activity carried out by an
investigator is recorded and logged.161 The copying of the website should be done on a
computer that is not non-attributable on the Internet.162 If copying is not feasible then
investigators should turn to alternatives such as printing, screenshoting or saving the
pages.163 “Authentication for websites is no different than any other evidence.”164 “The

Id. at 20-21 (providing explanations of each sections as well as a list that should
be included in the detail findings).
159

Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 27 (describing
different ways a copy can be acquired such as using specific software). See also Peter
Sommer, Information Assurance Advisory Council, Digital Evidence, digital
Investigations and E-Disclosure: A Guide to Forensic Readiness for Organizations,
Security Advisors and Lawyers, (2012), available at
https://cryptome.org/2014/03/digital-investigations.pdf 71-72 (listing software
that can be used and how it functions, as well as other considerations concerning
the copying of websites).
160

Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 27.
161

162

Id. (gives more explanations for the procedure)

Id. (make sure that this is done by a competent person because defects may be
detrimental).
163

Gregory Joseph, Internet and Email Evidence 2011, (2011), available at
http://www.jha.com/us/articles/viewarticle.php?75#ref*.
164
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requirement of authentication ... is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."165 Authenticity can be
established by witness testimony.166 HTML codes can be authenticated the same as
photographs and therefore can use the same procedure.167 However concerns may arise if
the investigator does not know the author of the site and relies solely on the site to
establish facts.168 Some website may be self-authenticating which eliminate
authentication problems.169

INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
“In general, no law regulates how long network service providers must retain account
records in the United States.”170 The Stored Communications Act 18 U.S.C. §§ 27012712 (“SCA”) regulates how the government can obtain stored account information from

Id. (Citing to United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998);
Johnson-Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3319 at *11 (Ohio App.
July 26, 2001)).
165

166

See Id. Footnote 1 (listing cases and describing the principles).

Id. Footnote 2 (citing Actonet, Ltd. v. Allou Health & Beauty Care, 219 F.3d 836,
848 (8th Cir. 2000) and describing the reasoning).
167

See Id. Footnote 3 & 4 (citing and describing Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins.
Co. of Am., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064-1065 (C.D. Cal. 2002) and Boim v. Holy Land
Found., 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007)).
168

See Id. (providing a description of self-authenticating websites). See also Id.
Footnote 9 & 10 (list of cases for self authenticating websites, the material that is
considered self-executing and other considerations/distinctions).
169

United States Department of Justice Executive Office for United States Attorneys,
Obtaining and Admitting Electronic Evidence, (2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/11/30/usab5906.pd
f 35.
170

36

network service providers such as Internet service providers.171 Whenever prosecutors or
agents seek stored email, account records, or subscriber information from a network
service provider, they must comply with the SCA.172 The statute sets forth privacy rights
for customers and subscribers of computer network service providers.173 Investigators
must figure out the proper procedure for obtaining the information sought by applying the
various classifications of the SCA to the facts of each case.174 The SCA applies to two
defines classes, which are: electronic communication service and remote computing
service.175 The electronic communication service (“ECS”) is “any service which provides
to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”176 “The
term “remote computing service” (“RCS”) is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) as ‘the
provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an
electronic communications system’.”177

Office of Legal Education Executive Office for United States Attorneys, Searching
and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations,
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf 115.
171

172

Id.

Id. See also Footnote 1 (SCA is also referred to as Electronic Communications
Privacy Act “ECPA”).
173

174

Id. at 116.

175

Id. at 117 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) and 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) respectively).

176

See Id. at 117-119 for cases and more details.

177

Id. at 19. See also Id. 119-120 for cases and more details.
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Next the investigators should classify the information sought.178 The first
classification is basic subscriber and session information.179 Second are records or other
information pertaining to a customer or subscriber.180 Third are contents and electronic
storage.181 Finally, the SCA’s classification in the context of emails.182
Now investigators must consider whether they are seeking to compel disclosure or
seeking to accept information disclosed voluntarily by the provider.183 If investigators
decide that they want to compel disclosure they can do so through five means. The
investigators can use a subpoena because The SCA permits the government to compel
disclosure of the basic subscriber and session information with the use of subpoena.184
Agents may obtain additional information if they obtain a subpoena and, either give prior
notice to the subscriber, or comply with the delayed notice provisions of § 2705(a).185
Investigators may also need to get a § 2703(d) court order to obtain most account logs

178

Id. at 116.

See Id. at 121 (providing a list of information that belongs to that class and
relevant cases concerning that class).
179

180

See Id. at 122. (explaining the class and providing relevant cases).

See Id. at 122-125 (provides more information and cases relating to the
classification).
181

182

Id. at 125-127 (explanations and cases).

183

Id. at 116.

For more information and cases related to the use of subpoena see Id. 128-129.
See also Id. 239-241 for a sample subpoena language.
184

Id. at 129-130. (lists the additional information that may be requested as well as
other consideration that need to be accounted for).
185

38

and most transactional records.186 “Investigators can obtain everything associated with an
account except for unopened email or voicemail stored with a provider for 180 days or
less using a 2703(d) court order that complies with the notice provisions of § 2705.”187
Lastly, “Investigators can obtain everything associated with an account with a search
warrant. The SCA does not require the government to notify the customer or subscriber
when it obtains information from a provider using a search warrant.”188
However, Internet service providers can voluntarily disclose information.
“Providers of services not available ‘to the public’ may freely disclose both contents and
other records relating to stored communications. The SCA imposes restrictions on
voluntary disclosures by providers of services to the public, but it also includes
exceptions to those restrictions.”189 The SCA contains provisions that are designed to aid
law enforcement officials working with network service providers. “Agents may direct
providers to preserve existing records pending the issuance of compulsory legal process.
Such requests have no prospective effect, however.”190 Additionally, there can be orders
not to disclose the existence of a warrant, subpoena or court order.191 “The Cable Act

See Id. at 130-132 (gives more details and mentions relevant cases). See also Id.
at 213-225 (sample applications and orders).
186

187

Id. For more information see Id. 132-133.

188

Id. For cases and more details see Id. 133-134.

Id. at 135. See also Id. at 135-138 for more information, cases and quick reference
guide.
189

Id. at 139. For more information see Id. 139-140. See also Id. at 225-227 (sample
language for preservation requests).
190

191

See Id. 140-141.
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restricts government access to cable operator records only when the records relate to
ordinary cable services. It does not restrict government access to records relating to
Internet access or telephone service provided by a cable operator.”192 Investigators should
also be aware that service providers may be entitled to reimbursement for costs and
expenses of providing the information.193 Furthermore, there are constitutional and
remedy considerations.194

EMAIL
Copies of emails can be found for both the sender and receiver on personal computers,
email servers, archives of the personal computer or server, and mobile devices.195 There
are generally two methods of accessing email and those are using a web browser and
accessing an email account (e.g. Hotmail, Google, Yahoo) or accessing emails through

192

Id at 141. For more information see Id. 141-142.

See Id. at 142-143. See also United States Department of Justice Executive Office
for United States Attorneys, Obtaining and Admitting Electronic Evidence, (2011),
available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/11/30/usab5906.pd
f 35-42 for more cases and discussion on Internet Service Providers. See Also
American Civil Liberties Union, et al. v. Janet Reno, Civ. Act. No. 98-CV-5591, Report
of Expert Witness Dan Farmer in ACLU v. Reno Ii, available at
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/report-expert-witness-dan-farmer-aclu-vreno-ii.
193

See Office of Legal Education Executive Office for United States Attorneys,
Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal
Investigations, available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf 144-149. (explaining in detail each
consideration).
194

Peter Sommer, Information Assurance Advisory Council, Digital Evidence, digital
Investigations and E-Disclosure: A Guide to Forensic Readiness for Organizations,
Security Advisors and Lawyers, (2012), available at
https://cryptome.org/2014/03/digital-investigations.pdf 55.
195
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programs that download them on a personal computer (Outlook or Windows Mail).196
“Key evidence is usually found in what is known as the email’s ‘Full Internet
Header’.”197 Headers are normally suppressed and they provide information on the source
and what route it took to get to the recipient.198 In order to obtain the full Internet header
the investigator must first ascertain which two methods the recipient uses for their
emails.199 Each webmail provider and email program treats full headers differently.200
Once the header has been exposed it should be printed out with the email.201 When the
header is obtained, then the investigators should attempt to identify the sender from the
originating IP address.202 If the identity of the sender is know but there is no email from
which a full header could be obtained, then investigators can request information from
Internet service providers and gather information of log in location and other relevant

Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 28.
196

197

Id.

Peter Sommer, Information Assurance Advisory Council, Digital Evidence, digital
Investigations and E-Disclosure: A Guide to Forensic Readiness for Organizations,
Security Advisors and Lawyers, (2012), available at
https://cryptome.org/2014/03/digital-investigations.pdf 55-56.
198

Association of Chief Police Officers, ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence,
(March 2012), available at http://www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensicsdocuments/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf 28.
199

Id. (if an investigator is not sure about which part is the header, he should
consult someone who does so there are no mistakes when dealing with the
evidence).
200

201

Id.

202

Id.

41

factors.203 When obtaining the emails there are special legal consideration that need to be
met.204 Moreover, authenticity of an email can be proved but there are special
considerations and restrictions.205
RECENT TRENDS AND USING EVIDENCE BEFORE AND AT TRIAL
The recent trends in searching and seizing electronic evidence are: search warrant
protocols, plain view waivers, border searches of electronic evidence, second warrants
and subjective motivations of forensic examiners.206 Using evidence in before and in trial
takes special considerations in order for the evidence to have the most effect.207

203

Id.

See Peter Sommer, Information Assurance Advisory Council, Digital Evidence,
digital Investigations and E-Disclosure: A Guide to Forensic Readiness for
Organizations, Security Advisors and Lawyers, (2012), available at
https://cryptome.org/2014/03/digital-investigations.pdf 56-57.
204

See Gregory Joseph, Internet and Email Evidence 2011, (2011), available at
http://www.jha.com/us/articles/viewarticle.php?75#ref* (providing cases and
considerations for authentication of email evidence).
205

For more information including a detailed analysis and cases see United States
Department of Justice Executive Office for United States Attorneys, Obtaining and
Admitting Electronic Evidence, (2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/11/30/usab5906.pd
f 72-78.
206

See Id. 52-71 (providing a detailed analysis including cases). See also U.S.
Department of Justice, Digital Evidence in the Courtroom: A Guide for Law
Enforcement and Prosecutors, (2014), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/211314.pdf.
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